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Ignoring the Golden Principle of
Charter Interpretation?
David M. Tanovich*

I. INTRODUCTION
One consistent and disturbing trend since the birth of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 in 1982 is that race has been and
continues to be, with a few notable exceptions, erased from the factual
narratives presented to the Supreme Court of Canada and from the
constitutional legal rules established by the Court in criminal procedure
cases. Understanding the etiology of this erasing is not easy. In earlier
pieces, the author has explored the role of trial and appellate lawyers.2
This paper focuses on principles of judicial review and the failure of the
Supreme Court to consistently consider the impact on Aboriginal and
racialized communities of the constitutional rules it creates or interprets.
What makes the silence so problematic is that the Court gave itself the
tool in 2001 to address part of the identified problem when it established
an anti-racism principle of Charter interpretation in R. v. Golden.3 This
paper seeks to address a number of questions focused on the legacy of
Golden. What is the origin and content of the Golden principle of
judicial review. Part II examines the evidence from subsequent cases and
academic commentary that this is indeed an accepted principle of
constitutional interpretation. Part III discusses the cases from the 2007
Supreme Court term that would have benefited from a critical race
analysis. Part IV discusses how consideration of Golden would have
impacted the Court’s analysis in R. v. Clayton4 in particular? Finally,
*

Faculty of Law, University of Windsor.
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See David M. Tanovich, “The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining
Racial Injustice in the Canadian Criminal Justice System” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. 655; and David M.
Tanovich, “The Further Erasure of Race in Charter Cases” (2006) 38 C.R. (6th) 84.
3
[2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Golden”]. I was counsel
for Mr. Golden in the Supreme Court of Canada.
4
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.).
1
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Part V explores how the Golden principle should be applied in future
cases.

II. THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE
On January 18, 1997, Ian Golden, a suspected drug dealer, was
subjected to multiple strip searches in a restaurant on a Saturday night in
downtown Toronto. There were a number of individuals present in the
restaurant during his ordeal. One of the searches took place in a narrow
stairwell. The second took place in the back of the restaurant. After he
was strip searched, he was restrained by numerous officers who tried to
dislodge a small baggie from his buttocks. During this attempted seizure,
Golden had an involuntary bowel movement. The police continued their
search using gloves that were used in the restaurant to clean the toilets.
Golden was subjected to a third strip search at the police station which
was a few blocks away. The issue before the Supreme Court of Canada
was what limits section 8 of the Charter imposed on this very intrusive
and humiliating police power.5 Golden was African-Canadian and the
Supreme Court had the benefit of the submissions of both the AfricanCanadian Legal Clinic, which characterized Golden’s ordeal as a public
lynching, and Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto.
In their majority judgment, Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. recognized the
critical race submissions of the intervenors and set out, albeit very
briefly, what I have characterized as the Golden principle:
… [W]e believe it is important to note the submissions of the ACLC
and the ALST that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are
overrepresented in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely
to represent a disproportionate number of those who are arrested by
police and subjected to personal searches, including strip searches
(Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba (1991), vol. 1,
The Justice System and Aboriginal People, at p. 107; Cawsey Report,
Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Criminal Justice
System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta
(1991), vol. II, p. 7, recommendations 2.48 to 2.50; Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging the Cultural Divide (1996), at pp. 3339; Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario Criminal Justice
5
A majority of the Court held that the police must have reasonable and probable grounds
to conduct a strip search and that absent exigent circumstances, it must never be conducted “in the
field”: supra, note 3, at para. 102. The majority also imposed other standards to ensure a reasonably
conducted strip search, such as authorization from a senior officer: id., at para. 101.
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System, Report of the Commission on Systemic Racism in the Ontario
Criminal Justice System (1995)). As a result, it is necessary to develop
an appropriate framework governing strip searches in order to prevent
unnecessary and unjustified strip searches before they occur.6

While it would have been helpful for the Court to expand on its analysis,
the message is clear. The Charter must be interpreted with a critical race
or anti-racist lens to give effect to systemic racism in the criminal justice
system including the over-policing of Aboriginal and racialized
communities. It is an approach that ensures that police powers are
limited or Charter standards established to shield these communities
from the negative effects of systemic racism, such as racial profiling.
Golden was not the first time that the Supreme Court applied
equality principles in the interpretation and application of the Charter. In
R. v. Mills,7 the Court applied a feminist lens in determining the
constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions (sections 278.1 to 278.91)
limiting an accused’s access to the therapeutic records of a sexual assault
complainant. Justices McLachlin and Iacobucci, for the majority, held
that:
Equality concerns must also inform the contextual circumstances in
which the rights of full answer and defence and privacy will come into
play. In this respect, an appreciation of myths and stereotypes in the
context of sexual violence is essential to delineate properly the
boundaries of full answer and defence. 8

Moreover, a critical race approach to Charter interpretation is an
integral part of the Supreme Court’s own approach to substantive

6

Id., at para. 83 (emphasis added).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.).
8
Id., at para. 90. It should be pointed out that the language of s. 278.7(2) of the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, demands that equality considerations be factored into the decision
whether or not to produce the records. The Supreme Court has also applied a critical race
perspective when interpreting statutory provisions that specifically demand an anti-discriminatory
approach to jury selection and sentencing. See R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R.
1128, at para. 47 (S.C.C.) (challenge for cause and s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code); R. v. Gladue,
[1999] S.C.J. No. 19, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (S.C.C.) (sentencing and s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal
Code). In the context of challenges for cause and s. 638(1)(b), McLachlin C.J.C. in Williams
observed (at para. 48) that:
7

[the right] may also be seen as an anti-discrimination right. The application, intentional
or unintentional, of racial stereotypes to the detriment of an accused person ranks among
the most destructive forms of discrimination. … The right must fall at the core of the
guarantee in s. 15 of the Charter.....
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equality under section 15(1).9 As the Chief Justice recognized in her
extra-judicial article entitled “Racism and the Law: The Canadian
Experience”:
This new paradigm [of substantive equality] is directly applicable to
racial and ethnic discrimination. It requires us to recognize the context
of historical, racial and ethnic inequality and the myths and stereotypes
that this context has produced. It requires us to disabuse ourselves of
these preconceived notions, acknowledged or unacknowledged, to
understand the reality that disadvantaged groups face, and to examine
the claim of unequal treatment afresh on the basis of this understanding.10

The Chief Justice further exhorted “the importance … of adapting the
law to combat the problem of widespread racism in society” and of
acknowledging that “courts can and should take proactive steps to
recognize racism and prevent it from compromising … justice.11

III. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE:
DOES IT EXIST BEYOND PARAGRAPH 83?
Following Golden, the Supreme Court applied a race-conscious lens
again, without citing Golden, in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral
Officer).12 The issue was whether the limitation on the right to vote for
individuals serving penitentiary sentences was a reasonable limit on
section 3 of the Charter. In her proportionality analysis, McLachlin
C.J.C., for the majority, held:
The negative effects of s. 51(e) upon prisoners have a
disproportionate impact on Canada’s already disadvantaged Aboriginal
population, whose overrepresentation in prisons reflects “a crisis in the
Canadian criminal justice system”: R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688,
at para. 64, per Cory and Iacobucci JJ. To the extent that the
disproportionate number of Aboriginal people in penitentiaries reflects
factors such as higher rates of poverty and institutionalized alienation

9
See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
143 (S.C.C.); Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.); and Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950
(S.C.C.).
10
(2002) 1 J.L. & Equality 7, at 20.
11
Id., at 21-22. See also the discussion in Richard Devlin & Matthew Sherrard, “The Big
Chill?: Contextual Judgment after Hamilton and Mason” (2005) 28 Dalhousie L.J. 409.
12
[2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.).
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from mainstream society, penitentiary imprisonment may not be a fair
or appropriate marker of the degree of individual culpability.13

An anti-racist approach to Charter interpretation has also been
applied post-Golden in appellate and trial courts. In R. v. Harris,14 for
example, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the need for factoring
in systemic racism in the context of assessing the seriousness of, in that
case, a section 9 violation under section 24(2) of the Charter. Justice
Doherty, for the Court, held:
I cannot accept the Crown’s characterization of this breach as
“minimally intrusive”. The use of the broad powers associated with
Highway Traffic Act stops to routinely investigate passengers who have
nothing to do with the concerns justifying those stops must have a
significant cumulative, long-term, negative impact on the personal
freedom enjoyed by those who find themselves subject to this kind of
police conduct. While for persons in some segments of the community,
these stops may be infrequent, this record suggests that for others the
stops are an all too familiar part of their day-to-day routine. Viewed
from the perspective of those who are most likely to find themselves
stopped and questioned by police, I think this form of interrogation is
anything but trivial. It seems to me at some point it must become
provocative.15

What is significant about Harris is that racial profiling was not argued in
the case and yet the Court was still preprared to factor the problem into
the constitutional analysis. In R. v. Khawaja,16 Rutherford J. struck down
the motive clause17 of the anti-terrorism provisions of the Criminal Code,18

13
Id., at para. 60. This kind of recognition of limited culpability because of systemic
racism could be applied in cases that challenge mandatory minimum sentences, particularly for
firearm possession cases under s. 12 of the Charter. See R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008
SCC 6 (S.C.C.), where the Court dismissed a constitutional challenge to s. 236(a) of the Criminal
Code which sets a minimum sentence of four years for manslaughter cases involving firearms.
14
[2007] O.J. No. 3185, 225 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C.A.).
15
Id., at para. 63.
16
[2006] O.J. No. 4245, 214 C.C.C. (3d) 399 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Khawaja”].
17
This motive clause forms part of the definition of “terrorist activity” in the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A), and provides that the impugned act must be
committed “in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause”.
18
Criminal Code, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A) is part of Part II.I, which was enacted as part of Bill
C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the
registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, S.C. 2001, c. 41 [hereinafter “Anti-terrorism
Act”]. It came into force on December 24, 2001.
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in part, because of a concern that it would enable racial and ethnic
profiling.19 As he put it:
It seems to me that the inevitable impact to flow from the inclusion of
the “political, religious or ideological purpose” requirement in the
definition of “terrorist activity” will be to focus investigative and
prosecutorial scrutiny on the political, religious and ideological beliefs,
opinions and expressions of persons and groups both in Canada and
abroad.20

And, most recently, in R. v. Samuels,21 Nakatsuru J. specifically
referred to Golden in support of his conclusion that a stay of proceedings
was necessary in a case involving an unconstitutional strip search of an
African Canadian charged with driving over the legal limit.22 He held
that:
Mr. Samuels is Afro-Canadian. It is his community that the Supreme
Court of Canada was acutely concerned about in ensuring that a
framework be established to prevent strip searches from occurring. …
From the perspective of individuals like Mr. Samuels, they may well
feel that their race has something to do with being subjected
unnecessarily to this humiliating procedure. … such a feeling, given
what was expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada, is not without
some validity from a systemic viewpoint. 23

Finally, academic commentators have recognized the existence and
validity of the Golden anti-racism principle of Charter interpretation. In
a paper commemorating the 25th anniversary of the Charter, Professor
Paciocco included Golden as one of the most significant Charter cases
ever decided “given that it purports to include the impact that laws and
practices can have on racialized communities as a constitutional

19

Khawaja, supra, note 16, at paras. 52-58.
Id., at para. 58.
21
[2008] O.J. No. 786 (Ont. C.J.).
22
Id., at para. 67, wherein he noted that “[a] second significant consideration in
determining the appropriate remedy in this case is the recognition there are larger systemic issues
involved in assessing the effects of strip searches.
23
Id., at para. 90. See also R. v. G. (P.F.), [2005] B.C.J. No. 1161 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) where
para. 83 of Golden was relied on, in part, to find that a strip search of an Aboriginal woman in
custody was unreasonable. See paras. 35, 36, 41-44. In R. v. F. (E.), [2007] O.J. No. 1000 (Ont.
C.J.), defence counsel relied on Golden in arguing that s. 42(5)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act,
S.C. 2002, c. 1 violated s. 15(1) of the Charter. See paras. 117-18. Section 42(5)(a) excludes serious
violent offences from eligibility for deferred custody and supervision. The argument was rejected by
the trial judge.
20
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consideration …”.24 In his criticism of the Supreme Court decision in R.
v. Hall25 and its decision to uphold the the constitutionality of the tertiary
bail ground (section 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code), Professor Stuart
observed:
A surprising and disappointing feature of the majority judgment in
Hall is the failure of the majority to consider the issue of context. … In
Golden, for example, the majority of the Court considered it important
to develop standards for strip searches by taking into account
Commission reports that African Canadians and Aboriginal people are
over-represented in the criminal justice system and are therefore likely
to be disproportionately arrested and subjected to personal searches,
including strip searches.26

Similarly, in his piece on the failure of the Supreme Court to address
race in the investigative detention case of R. v. Mann,27 Professor Berger
noted, referring to Golden, that “the Court has used equality values to
inform their rulings concerning legal rights in other cases.”28

IV. THE SILENCING OF THE GOLDEN PRINCIPLE
DURING THE 2007 TERM
The 2007 term provided the Supreme Court with a number of
opportunities to further develop and apply the Golden principle.29 In
24
David Paciocco, “The Top Ten and the Tetherball”, paper presented at 25 Years of the
Charter (Toronto: Criminal Lawyers Association Conference, 2007), at 33.
25
[2002] S.C.J. No. 65, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hall”].
26
Don Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
2005), at 415. See also Don Stuart, “The Ontario Court of Appeal Blinks and Flutters: Less
Exclusion and Inconsistency in Stop Cases” (2007) 49 C.R. (6th) 282.
27
[2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mann”].
28
Benjamin Berger, “Race and Erasure in R. v. Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 58, at note 25
[hereinafter “Berger”]. See also Steve Coughlan, “Search Based on Articulable Cause: Proceed with
Caution or Full Stop?” (2002) 2 C.R. (6th) 49, at note 80.
29
Prior to 2007, there were a number of instances where the Court could have applied the
Golden principle. These include Hall, supra, note 25, and Re Application Under s. 83.28 of the
Criminal Code, [2004] S.C.J. No. 40, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 which considered the investigative
hearing provisions in s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code. Another instance was Mann, supra, note 27,
where the Court recognized a police power in s. 9 to detain individuals for investigation on
reasonable grounds to suspect their involvement in a recent or ongoing crime. The case involved an
Aboriginal accused. The Court further recognized a power to frisk search detained individuals where
there are reasonable grounds to believe they are in possession of a weapon. While the Court’s
concern about monitoring street encounters is consistent with ensuring protection against racial
profiling, the Court failed to address how racial profiling operates in this context, failed to address
the implications for a narrow approach to detention in race-cases and failed to address whether
Mann himself had been the victim of racially biased policing. See further the discussion in David M.
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Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),30 the Court failed
to apply a critical race lens despite evidence before it that the security
certificate process is having a disproportionate impact on Arab and
Muslim men.31 In their intervenors factum, the Canadian Council on
American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Canadian Muslim Civil
Liberties Association (CMCLA) framed the equality issue as follows:
Charter claims must be analyzed in the larger social, historical and
political context in which they arise. The issues in this case must
therefore be examined in the context of the Canadian social reality, in
which selected minority communities have historically been targets of
discrimination in times of public fear over real or perceived threats to
national security. In the current context, the Muslim community is the
target group.32

While it is true that the Court did find that the judicial approval
process of the security certificate was fundamentally flawed under
section 7 because of its heightened secrecy requirements, there is no
Tanovich, “The Colourless World of Mann” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 47; Tim Quigley, “Mann, It’s a
Disappointing Decision” (2004) 21 C.R. (6th) 41; and Berger, supra, note 28.
30
[2007] S.C.J. No. 9, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 350 (S.C.C.). At issue was the constitutionality of
ss. 77-85 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 [hereinafter “IRPA”],
entered into force June 20, 2002. The IRPA permits the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to issue a certificate declaring that a
foreign national or permanent resident is inadmissible to Canada because that person is a security
threat. Once the certificate is issued, the named person is detained. If a judge determines that the
certificate is reasonable, the person is subject to a removal order. However, the detainee is not
entitled to see any of the information in the possession of the Ministers and must rely on summaries
provided by the judge. For a discussion of the process, see Marianne Davies, “Unequal Protection
Under the Law: Re Charkaoui and the Security Certificate Process under the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act” (2006) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 375; Benjamin Berger, “Our Evolving Judicature:
Security Certificates, Detention Review and the Federal Court” (2006) 39 U.B.C. L. Rev. 101; and
Colleen Bell, “Subject to Exception: Security Certificates, National Security and Canada’s ‘War on
Terror’” (2006) 21 Can. J. Law & Society 63.
31
As the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CAN) and the Canadian
Muslim Civil Liberties Association (CMCLA) noted at para. 36 of their intervenor factum:
Since the adoption of the IRPA in 2002, the impugned sections have been used
specifically to target Muslims. While terrorism is known to exist globally and to be
carried out by individuals of all religions and ethnicities, security certificates under the
IRPA — with the sole exception of the notorious German hate-monger Ernst Zundal
(who is not an accused terrorist) — have been applied exclusively against Muslim men
from Arab countries.
(On file with the author and available online at: <http://www.caircan.ca/downloads/SCC_factum.pdf>.)
For a discussion of racial profiling in the war on terrorism, see Reem Bahdi, “No Exit: Racial
Profiling and Canada’s War Against Terrorism” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293; and David M.
Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at chapter 7
[hereinafter “The Colour of Justice”].
32
CAIR-CAN and CMCLA factum, supra, note 31, at para. 10 (footnote omitted).
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discussion or even acknowledgment of the broader social context of
racial profiling or stereotyping and Islamaphobia.33 Nor did the Court
adequately address the issue of differential treatment of permanent
residents/foreign nationals and citizens.34 By failing to address these
issues, the Court failed to engage in whether or not a security certificate
process is even necessary in light of relevant Criminal Code provisions
which would apply to everyone equally regardless of immigration status,
or to ensure that Parliament would include sufficient safeguards to
address the problem in the new regime it puts in place.35
The Court could have also considered the Golden principle in R. v.
Singh,36 a case which raised the issue of whether there should be an
obligation on the police to cease questioning under section 7 when an
accused asserts his or her right to remain silent. Singh, a South Asian
accused, had asserted his right to remain silent 18 times. Given the
heightened vulnerability of Aboriginal and racialized individuals in
custody not only to violence but to waive their constitutional rights, a
bright line rule would have gone some way in ensuring protection
against one manifestation of systemic racism in the criminal justice
33
The Court limited its analysis to procedural fairness and the failure of the process to give
detained individuals sufficient information or a substitute for that information in order to ensure an
ability to make full answer and defence. Charkaoui, supra, note 30, at paras. 28-87. The Court also
found that the inability of foreign nationals to have a review until 120 days had passed from the date
of judicial confirmation of the certificate was arbitrary under ss. 9 and 10(c) of the Charter: id., at
paras. 91-94.
34
The Court simply relied on the fact that s. 6 of the Charter permits differential treatment
based on citizenship (i.e., s. 6(1) gives only citizens the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada):
id., at para. 129. An argument justifying differential treatment based on immigration status was
made and accepted by the House of Lords in A. (F.C.) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 (H.L.).
35
Parliament responded to Charkaoui with Bill C-3 which received Royal Assent on
February 22, 2008: An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (certificate and
special advocate) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, S.C. 2008, c. 3. The Bill
leaves the process largely unchanged with the exception of uniform detention review periods (s. 82),
an exclusionary rule for evidence obtained by torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment (s. 83(1.1)), a limited right of appeal (s. 79), and the creation of a special advocate
process to address the case to meet concerns raised by the Supreme Court (s. 83(1.2) and 85). For
criticisms of Bill C-3, see Maude Barlow, Roch Tassé & Sameer Zuberi, “Rushing Injustice
Through the Senate” Toronto Star, February 13, 2008; and, Ziyaad Mia, “Bill C-3 Doesn’t Deliver
Justice” Ottawa Citizen, February 11, 2008.
36
[2007] S.C.J. No. 48, 2007 SCC 48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singh”]. For criticism and
discussion see, Don Stuart, “Annotation” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 201; Lisa Dufraimont, “Annotation”
(2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 203; Dale Ives & Christopher Sherrin, “R. v. Singh — A Meaningless Right to
Silence with Dangerous Consequences” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 250; and Timothy Moore and Karina
Gagnier, “‘You can talk if you want to’: Is the Police Caution on the ‘Right to Silence’
Understandable?” (2007) 51 C.R. (6th) 233.
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system. This vulnerability was discussed at length by the 1991 Manitoba
Justice Inquiry report, a report cited in Golden:
… Aboriginal people, particularly those in remote communities and
those whose primary language is not English, appear to have special
problems in exercising their rights to remain silent and to refrain from
incriminating themselves. Their statements appear to be particularly
open to being misunderstood by police interrogators and, as a result,
may convey inaccurate information when read out in court. Their
vulnerability arises from the legal system’s inability to break down the
barriers to effective communication between Aboriginal people and
legal personnel, and to differences of language, etiquette, concepts of
time and distance, and so on. This matter has been considered in a
number of courts, but perhaps the fullest explanation was given in an
Australian court. This issue is so central to the role of the police in
questioning suspects and taking statements that we quote in full the
explanation given by Justice Forster in setting forth what are now
called the Anunga Rules.37

Rule 8 of the Anunga Rules specifically provides that “if an Aboriginal
person states he does not wish to answer further questions or any
questions the interrogation should not continue.”38 Unfortunately,
Charron J., for a slim 5:4 majority in Singh, declined to limit the ability
of the police to interrogate even after repeated assertions of a request to
remain silent and dismissed the appeal. In her view, the state interest in
the effective investigation of crime was more important than the
certainty and additional protection against self-incrimination that a
bright line rule would provide.39 The majority decision has effectively
removed the right of suspects to remain silent during police
questioning.40
Perhaps the most disappointing omission of the Golden principle
occurred in R. v. Clayton,41 a case concerning the creation of a police
37
Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba, Vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Queen’s Printer,
1991), at chapter 16. The Manitoba Justice Inquiry recommended that the Anunga Rules be adopted
in Canada. See also Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the Canadian Criminal Justice
System and its Impact on the Indian and Metis People of Alberta (Edmonton: The Task Force,
1991), at 2-57. For a further discussion of the Anunga Rules, see R. v. Moneyas, [1995] A.J. No.
1310 (Alta. Prov. Ct.).
38
See R. v. Anunga (1976), 11 A.L.R. 412.
39
Singh, supra, note 36, at paras. 42-53.
40
The decision does not impact on situations where the individual is unaware of the fact
that he or she is speaking to a person in authority.
41
[2007] S.C.J. No. 32, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 725 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of the case, see
Steve Coughlan, “Arbitrary Detention: Whither — or Wither? — Section 9” (2008) 40 S.C.L.R.
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power to erect a roadblock upon receipt of a “gun call”. I say most
disappointing because it was a case where the Court created a new police
power and because of the evidence that the war on guns is having a
disproportionate impact on racialized communities in Canada.42

V. SECTION 9 AND POLICE ROADBLOCKS IN GUN CASES:
R. V. CLAYTON
1. The Facts of Clayton
At approximately 1:22 a.m., the police received a 911 call from an
individual who reported seeing a group of 10 Black men outside a strip
club in Brampton, four of whom publicly displayed their guns.
According to the caller, “they had them and took them out and they put
them back in all together.”43 The caller provided very specific
information about the group. He was able to describe in great detail the
vehicles they used to get to the club:
•
•
•
•

a black GMC Blazer;
a black Jeep Cherokee;
a tan-coloured Lexus LS; and
a white two-door Acura Legend.44

He described their clothing as “regular street wear”.45 He was able to
describe the guns. He told the dispatcher that they were not revolvers but
fired bullets from clips like a “glock”.46
The police responded to the call within minutes. A car that did not
match the description was permitted to leave. After that, the police
decided to set up, on their own initiative, a roadblock at both entrances
to the club. Their intent was to stop every car coming from “that area
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because it was a gun call”.47 The second vehicle to leave the parking lot,
approximately five minutes after the 911 call was made, was a “sporty
black” Jaguar. It did not resemble in any way the cars that had been
described by the tipster. Farmer was driving while Clayton was in the
passenger seat. The car was detained by Constables Robson and
Dickson. Although there did not appear to have been any plan in place
about what they would do once a car was stopped, the trial judge was
satisfied that Constable Robson’s intention was to at least search the
vehicle while Constable Dickson’s intention was to have the occupants
get out of the car and then to search both them and the car.48
After stopping the car, the officers advised Clayton and Farmer
about why they had been stopped and asked them to get out of the car.
According to the officers, their suspicions were raised by the appellants’
demeanour (e.g., nervous and no eye contact), reluctance to get out of
the car, their answer to the question whether they had seen anything (i.e.,
“we just got here”), and the fact that Clayton was wearing gloves when it
did not seem like “glove weather”. Once outside, Clayton fled when
Constable Robson placed his hand on his shoulder to direct him to the
back of the car. He was tackled by other officers near the club and
identified by one of the bouncers as one of the gunmen. Clayton
admitted having a gun in his pants pocket and was arrested. Farmer was
arrested and a search incident to the arrest revealed a gun lodged in his
belt. The arrests took place six minutes after the 911 call was made.
The central issue was whether the police had lawful authority to
conduct a roadblock in these circumstances. The problem for the police
and courts was that there was no recognized common law power to
authorize the roadblock implemented by the police in this case. The only
two available powers were the Mann and Murray powers.49 However,
neither applied in this case.50
47

See Clayton, trial judgment, supra, note 44, at para. 11.
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The Mann power to conduct investigative detentions requires reasonable grounds to
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2. The Supreme Court Decision
Justice Abella, for a six-person majority, turned to the common law
ancillary powers doctrine first articulated in the English case of R. v.
Waterfield.51 In her view, if the roadblock is authorized by the ancillary
powers doctrine and consistent with Charter values, then it is lawful and,
therefore, not arbitrary under section 9. According to the majority, the
“justification for a police officer’s decision to detain … will depend on
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ underlying the officer’s suspicion that
the detention of a particular individual is ‘reasonably necessary’”.52 The
“totality of the circumstances” include the seriousness of the offence, the
information known to the police about the suspect or the crime, and the
extent to which the detention was reasonably responsive or tailored to
these circumstances, including its geographic and temporal scope.53 The
critical task involves
balancing the seriousness of the risk to public or individual safety with
the liberty interests of members of the public to determine whether,
given the extent of the risk, the nature of the stop is no more intrusive
of liberty interests than is reasonably necessary to address the risk. 54

Applying this analysis, the majority held that the Waterfield balance
authorizes the police to erect a reasonably tailored roadblock when
investigating a serious crime and where it would be an effective way to
apprehend the perpetrators. It also authorizes the police to order the
occupants out of the vehicle and to conduct a pat-down for officer safety
where there are reasonable grounds to conclude that one or more of them
are armed. On the facts of the case, Abella J. was satisfied that the
roadblock was reasonable and effective given the nature of the risk and
the geographic and temporal proximity to the 911 call. She further held
that the continued detention and pat-down search of the appellants was
lawful because the officers had reasonable grounds to suspect that they
were in possession of guns. Those grounds included geographic and
temporal proximity to the 911 call, the use of the rear exit, the
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occupants’ race, Farmer’s reluctance to exit the vehicle, Clayton’s
suspicious answers to the officers’ questions and his wearing gloves.55
3. Commentary
While this case was not, as Doherty J. so emphatically put it in his
Court of Appeal decision, a racial profiling case,56 there were a number
of aspects of the decision that would have greatly benefited from an antiracist analysis. Indeed, a critical race perspective may have led the Court
to affirm the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.57
(a) Adding to the Officer’s Discretionary Arsenal
Discretion is the breeding ground of racial profiling and Clayton
adds to the discretionary arsenal of the police. While the dangers of
racial profiling or over-policing are greatly reduced on the facts of this
case because of the geographic and temporal proximity of the police
response, they become more evident if we move from the parking lot of
a strip club to a largely racialized neighbourhood or apartment complex.
What if the next 911 caller reports seeing two Black men with guns
55

Justice Binnie, on behalf of two other Justices, took a different approach although he
came to the same conclusion. He acknowledged the existence of a power under the ancillary powers
doctrine to conduct a roadblock but concluded that the power violated s. 9 because of the absence of
any criteria for vehicle selection: id., at para. 103. He then turned to s. 1 and concluded that the limit
was a reasonable one in the context of gun cases. What Binnie J. effectively did was to create a limit
prescribed by law for the purposes of s. 1 and then went on to justify the limit as reasonable: id., at
paras. 108-122. It is suggested that the Abella J. approach of interpreting the common law in a
constitutional fashion is much less doctrinally confusing. It is also more consistent with the
approach the Court previously took in R. v. Godoy, [1999] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311 and
Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). In neither case did the Court engage in a
s. 1 analysis.
56
He was responding to the argument raised by Farmer’s counsel for the first time on
appeal. See Clayton (Ont. C.A.), supra, note 45, at para. 7.
57
The Court of Appeal concluded that the roadblock was not reasonably tailored because
the appellants’ vehicle did not match those described by the 911 caller. As Doherty J.A. put it:
A roadblock tailored to the information provided to the police may have been justified
under that doctrine. However, a roadblock stop of any and all persons leaving the parking
area regardless of whether they or their vehicles matched or even resembled the description
provided by the caller went beyond what could be justified under the ancillary power
doctrine. The police could not rely on the information provided by the 911 caller to
establish the roadblock stop and then ignore the details of that information on the
assumption that the caller may have been mistaken in his identification of the individuals
or vehicles involved.
Clayton (Ont. C.A.), id., at para. 62.
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walking down a busy street in St. Jamestown in Toronto on a Saturday
night. Will the police be able to close off the streets and detain and
search all Black men on the street or in a vehicle within the vicinity?58
For how long would such a power last? What if the caller reports seeing
four Black men enter an apartment building? Will the police be able to
conduct a sweep of the apartment building? These examples are far more
realistic, probable and troubling than the Skydome example given by
Binnie J. in his concurring opinion.59 The concern about the disproportionate
impact of the Clayton or other newly created police power on racialized
communities particularly given the heavily publicized link between race
and guns is a relevant consideration under the Waterfield balancing and
the Court should have identified it as such in the case-by-case approach
it utilized.
(b) The Impact of Over-policing on Racialized Communities
Disproportionate impact does not just refer to who is subjected to a
police detention or search. It is also relevant to assessing the nature and
scope of the liberty interest interfered with. The evidence is overwhelming
as to the impact that over-policing has on Aboriginal and racialized
communities. These effects which include psychological trauma,
alienation, and mistrust were documented in the 2003 Ontario Human
Rights Commission report on racial profiling.60 The Court should have
recognized this as a relevant consideration particularly as the appellants
were Black. Had they done so, it is unlikely that Binnie J. would have
characterized roadblock stops as of “ relatively short duration and slight
inconvenience”.61
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In R. v. William, [2006] O.J. No. 5330 (Ont. S.C.J.), a stop of a vehicle that did not
match the colour of a vehicle linked to a gun call was found to be arbitrary. William was decided
pre-Clayton. Given the temporal and geographic proximity to the gun call which involved the
reporting of 10 shots being fired, the case would likely be decided differently under Clayton.
59
Clayton, supra, note 41, Binnie J. posits (at para. 92):

Of course, hypotheticals can be invented to test the outer limits of this approach.
Suppose, instead of the Million Dollar Saloon, the police received a similar 911 gun call
from the Toronto Skydome at a time when 5,000 cars were attempting to leave the
parking areas all at once after a ball game.
60

Ontario Human Rights Commission, Paying the Price: The Human Cost of Racial
Profiling (October 21, 2003). Available online at: <http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/resources/discussion_
consultation/RacialProfileReportEN>.
61
Supra, note 41, at para. 99.
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(c) Using Race as Part of a Suspect’s Description
Race is a very unreliable marker of identification contrary to what
Binnie J. observed in his concurring opinion wherein he noted “… the
911 caller must be presumed to be less error prone in dealing with a
person’s appearance, which calls for less specialized knowledge and less
sophisticated powers of observation.”62 Moreover, we have seen many
incidents where race becomes the dominant characteristic of the
investigation thereby subjecting many innocent individuals to police
scrutiny.63 Since the Court specifically relied on race as one of the
relevant factors in determining whether to further detain the appellants, it
should have issued a strong warning about the dangers associated with
race-based suspect descriptions. It could have, for example, warned that
race should only be used where it is part of a detailed description and
there are other safeguards present to ensure that race does not become
the primary basis of suspect selection.64 In this case, those limiting
features included the spatial and temporal aspects of the roadblock.
(d) Drawing Incriminating Inferences from Equivocal Behaviour
One of the hallmarks of racial profiling is the turning of innocuous
or equivocal conduct into suspicious behaviour because the officer is
relying on a stereotypical lens in drawing his or her conclusions.65 In this
case, the appellants’ failure to make eye contact, utterances such as “you
gotta be kidding” or “this is ridiculous” and nervousness were equally
consistent with either their fear of the police because of their own
individual or community experiences and/or a history of harassment. In
this case, however, there were other factors that minimized the
likelihood of misinterpretation, including the objectively suspicious
response given by Clayton (i.e., “we just got here”); the use of the rear
exit; Clayton’s gloves; and the fact that they were stopped five minutes
after the 911 call. Nevertheless, the Court could have warned against too
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readily drawing negative inferences when interpreting the conduct of
Aboriginal and racialized individuals to protect against racial profiling.
While the last two points (i.e., (c) and (d)) would not have likely
changed the Court’s conclusion given the unique facts of the case, the
first two (i.e., (a) and (b)), which, in this case, were more relevant to the
issue of roadblock jurisdiction than post-roadblock conduct, may very
well have led the Court to pause before concluding that extending
Waterfield on these facts was reasonably necessary.

VI. CONCLUSION
Given the systemic problem of racial profiling, the Supreme Court
will have no shortage of cases in the coming years to acknowledge and
further develop the Golden principle of Charter interpretation.66 A proper
application of the Golden principle in these and other Charter cases
would require the Court to use the following framework:
1. Does the existing power or law (or will the proposed new police
power) have a disproportionate impact on Aboriginal or racialized
individuals?
(a) In Golden, the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact
that the effects of police powers are disproportionately felt by
these communities.67
2. If yes, are there safeguards or enhanced Charter standards that can
be put (or already are) in place to minimize the disproportionate
negative effects or to address the effects of over-policing?68 These
safeguards or standards might include creating a reverse onus of
proof,69 a presumption of racial profiling in cases where there are no
66

One such case is R. v. Grant, [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 99 (S.C.C), which will address when
street encounters with the police trigger s. 9 and the proper approach to exclusion of evidence under
s. 24(2).
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Similarly, in Peart v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2006] O.J. No. 4457, 43
C.R. (6th) 175, at para. 94 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Peart”], the Court noted that courts have
accepted “that racial profiling occurs and is a day-to-day reality in the lives of those minorities
affected by it”.
68
For a further discussion of using enhanced Charter standards to address racial profiling,
see The Colour of Justice, supra, note 31, at 138-49; and David M. Tanovich, “Using the Charter to
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(2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 145, at 178-86.
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the door open should better evidence of the scope of the problem come before the Court.
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objectively reasonable grounds for the detention or search,70 the
implementation of a data collection system,71 or finally, proof of
enhanced anti-racial profiling police training.72 If there are no
safeguards or standards in place, the power or law should be
abolished or not recognized.73
3. Are enhanced Charter standards necessary to ensure that racialized
litigants will have meaningful access to Charter litigation?74
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See The Colour of Justice, supra, note 31, at 135-37.
For a discussion of the Kingston Police Service data collection project, see William
Closs & Paul McKenna, “Profiling a Problem in Canadian Police Leadership: The Kingston Data
Collection Project” (2006) 49 Can. Public Admin. 143. See also The Colour of Justice, supra, note
31, at 78-82 and 173-77.
72
See Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J.
No. 66, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at para. 157 (S.C.C.). See the discussion of anti-racial profiling police
training in Nassiah v. Peel Regional Police Services Board, [2007] O.H.R.T.D. No. 14 (Ont.
H.R.T.).
73
Had the Court considered this question in R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine, [2003] S.C.J.
No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571 (S.C.C.) (s. 7 challenge to the marijuana possession law), the Court
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81, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.), for example, where the Supreme Court refused to recognize that a
passenger in a motor vehicle has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car and therefore
standing to challenge a vehicle search. See also the discussion of this issue in David M. Tanovich,
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